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THE SUPREMACY OF UNITED STATES 
(MARITIME) LAW REVISITED 
ANDREW BROWN" 
I. THE DAY THE EARTH AND SEA SUBSTANTIALLY BECAME 
ONE 
Then God said, 'Let the water under the sky be gathered into a 
single basin, so that the dry land may appear.' And so it hap-
pened: the water under the sky was gathered into its basin, and 
the dry land appeared. 
God called the dry land 'the earth, ' and the basin of the water he 
called 'the sea.' God saw how good it was. I 
In the Supreme Court's 2004 Noifolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby decision, the 
Court sought to simplify the controlling-law question in multi-modal 
transportation contract disputes: "Our cases do not draw clean lines be-
tween maritime and non-maritime contracts. We have recognized that 
'[t]he boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts - as opposed to 
torts or crimes - being conceptual rather than spatial, have always been 
difficult to draw."'3 Previous to the Kirby decision, a Federal Court hear-
* B.A. Ohio State University; J.D. Candidate (2006), University of Tennessee College of 
Law. This note is a supplement intended to complement an article by the author, published in the 
JOURNAL OF TRANSPORTATION, LoGISTICS AND POLICY, IQ 2006. 
I. Genesis 2:9-10 (THE NEW AMERICAN BIBLE). 
2. 543 U.S. 14, 125 S. Ct. 385, 160 L. Ed. 2d 283 (2004) [hereinafter Kirby]. 
3. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 393 (quoting Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S. Ct. 
886, 6 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1961)). 
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ing this case would fIrst answer the question of whether federal admiralty 
law governed.4 
In the 1961 Kossick V. United Fruit Co. 5 decision, the Supreme Court 
held that a purported maritime case must be subject to federal admiralty 
jurisdiction before federal maritime law was applicable.6 Ten years later 
in the Victory Carriers, Inc. V. Law7 decision, the Court similarly held 
that "[w]hether federal maritime law govern[s] an accident ... depends 
on whether [the case is] within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
conferred on the district courts by the Constitution and the jurisdictional 
statutes.s" However previous to the Kirby decision, the multi-modal na-
ture of the contract(s) would require additional consideration before it 
could be classifIed as a "maritime" contract governed by the federal ad-
miralty and maritime law.9 
In the federal maritime case law preceding the Kirby decision, contracts 
for carriage of goods that involved more than water transportation: air 
and water or land and water (hence "multi-modal"), were "regarded as 
'mixed' contracts."10 Pre-dating the Civil War, the long-standing Su-
preme Court precedent precluded federal maritime jurisdiction over 
mixed contracts, because they were not purely maritime. ll Following 
suit, the lower federal courts uniformly refused to grant admiralty juris-
diction to plaintiffs who brought suit related to their mixed contracts. 12 
However, during the last 150 years, the lower courts created two excep-
tions to the mixed contract exclusion rule. 13 
The fIrst exception came into play when the "maritime and non-maritime 
elements of a mixed contract [we]re separable, admiralty jurisdiction 
would exist over the maritime element."14 The second exception applied 
when the "non-maritime element of the contract [was] merely 'inciden-
4. See Michael F. Sturley, Rewriting Maritime Law: The Supreme Court's November Sur· 
prise, 2-4 BENEDICf'S MAR. BULL. 295, 299 (2004). 
5. 365 u.s. 731, 81 S. Ct. 886, 6 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1961). 
6. Sturley, supra note 4, at 299. 
7. 404 U.S. 202,92 S. Ct. 418, 30 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1971). 
8. Sturley, supra note 4, at 299 (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 204 
(1971)). Remember, the U.S. Constitution grants the Supreme Court (and all inferior federal courts) 
jurisdiction over "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl. I. 
9. Id. 
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tal' to the maritime element;" here, the federal courts recognized that 
admiralty jurisdiction controlled. 15 
In Kirby, the contract(s) at issue contained both ocean and rail carriage, 
so the mixed contract doctrine would normally apply. And, since the 
maritime elements of the contract(s) were at issue, and because the sev-
eral hundred mile rail traverse was not incidental, the two exceptions to 
the mixed contract doctrine were not applicable. 16 However, the Court 
tipped its hand when it stated that "under a conceptual rather than spatial 
approach, ... the[se] are essentially maritime ... contracts."I? To over-
come the mixed contract doctrine's unquestionable applicability to the 
Kirby contract, the Court over-ruled it, "at least in the context of the mul-
timodal contract at issue in Kirby."ls However, before the Court did so, 
it sought to prove that the mixed contract doctrine was in opposition to 
federal precedent that required courts to conceptually determine the na-
ture of the contract at issue. 
First, the Court reiterated that the federal precedent for determining if a 
contract was "maritime" was based not on geography (spatial) but on 
ultimate purpose (conceptual).19 The Court stated that in rigidly applying 
the mixed contract rule, the lower courts were conducting a spatial analy-
sis when "[holding] that admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to con-
tracts which require maritime and non-maritime transportation, unless 
the non-maritime transportation is merely incidental-and that long-
distance travel is not incidental."2o The Court cited several examples of 
this spatial abuse. 
In Hartford Fire Ins. co. v. Orient Oversees Containers Lines,21 the court 
held that "transport by land under a bill of lading [was] not 'incidental' 
to transport by sea if the land segment involves great and substantial dis-
tances, and land transport of over 850 miles across four countries [was] 
more than incidental."22 Similarly, in Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Danzig,23 
the court held that "intermodal transport contracts were not maritime 
contracts because they called for 'substantial transportation between 
inland locations and ports both in this country and the Middle East' that 
IS. [d. 
16. [d. 
17. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 393 (emphasis added). 
18. Sturley, supra note 4, at 300. 
19. See Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 394. 
20. [d. 
21. 230 F.3d 549 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
22. !d. at 555-56. 
23. 211 F.3d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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was not incidental to the transportation by sea."24 In response to these 
cases, the Kirby Court felt that labeling a non-maritime leg "incidental" 
was "imprecise" because "each leg of the [multi-modal] journey [was] 
essential to accomplishing the contract's purpose."25 Additionally, the 
Court cited Kossick as precedent for their preferred "conceptual" over 
"spatial" approach.26 The Court then announced its purported solution to 
the lower federal courts' break from the conceptual precedent: 
Conceptually, so long as a bill of lading requires substantial car-
riage of goods by sea, its purpose is to effectuate maritime com-
merce - and thus it is a maritime contract. Its character as a 
maritime contract is not defeated simply because it also provides 
for some land carriage. Geography, then, is useful in a concep-
tual inquiry only in a limited sense: If a bill's sea components are 
insubstantial, then the bill is not a maritime contract.27 
On paper, this re-affirmation of the "conceptual" approach serves to open 
the door for federal courts to unabashedly analyze multi-modal "mari-
time" contracts, but also opens the doors to new controversy. 
In his article: "Kirby V. Norfolk Southern: The Salty Train Wreck," 
transportation lawyer Andrew D. Kehagiaras stated the obvious with 
regard to the jurisdiction section of the Kirby decision: "The Court's 
ruling on 'substantial' carriage by sea begs the question as to what quali-
fies as being 'substantial.' Does 'substantial' mean that the carriage by 
sea is substantial in and of itself? Or is the carriage by sea 'substantial' 
when compared to the accompanying inland transportation?,,28 Because 
of these obvious unanswered issues, the Kirby Court's jurisdiction ques-
tion is clearly out of tune with the Court's purported reason for creating a 
rule that would permit the application of federal maritime law in this 
case: uniformity. 29 
24. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 394 (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Danzig, 211 F.3d 1373, 1378 
(D.C. Cir. 2(00». 
25. [d. 
26. [d. at 395 (citing Kossick, 365 S. Ct. at 735) (UFurthennore, to the extent that these lower 
court decisions fashion a rule for identifying maritime contracts that depends solely on geography, 
they are inconsistent with the conceptual approach our precedent requires"). 
27. [d. 
28. Andrew D. Kehagiaras, Kirby v. Norfolk Southern: The Salty Train Wreck, 2-4 
BENEDICf'S MAR. BULL. 295, 306 (2004). 
29. See Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 396 (noting that U[wle have explained that Article ill's grant of 
admiralty jurisdiction 'must have referred to a system of law coextensive with and operating uni-
formly in, the whole country."') (quoting American Dredging Co. v. MiIler, 510 U.S. 443, 451 
(1994) (some citations omitted). 
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If "uniformity" was the raison d'etre for the Kirby decision, how does 
deriding a federal doctrine that was uniformly applied by the lower fed-
eral courts (the mixed contract doctrine) to create a confusing new stan-
dard ("substantial" carriage) not "undennine the uniformity of general 
maritime law?,,30 The Court went so far as to criticize the imprecise 
quality of the word "incidental" as used by the lower courts in applying 
the mixed contract doctrine.3! However, the Court has not achieved 
much by itself employing an "imprecise" adjective like substantial. Ob-
viously in the Kirby case, the transportation of machinery from Australia 
to Georgia by sea is substantial. But, as Mr. Kehagiaras lamented, what 
about a contract that calls for equal land and sea travel? Or, what about a 
contract that calls for more land travel than sea? By creating a "soft"32 
rule, the Court has all but assured that the lower federal courts will strug-
gle to determine what "substantial" actually means. Despite this obvious 
shortcoming, some see this particular extension of admiralty jurisdiction 
as a limited advancement. 
In his article "Rewriting Maritime Law: The Supreme Court's November 
Surprise,"33 Professor Michael F. Sturley opined that "[t]his new rule is a 
welcome addition to the general maritime law. In essence, the Court has 
judicially created one of the suggestions that the Maritime Law Associa-
tion advocated in its proposed COGS A amendments."34 However, de-
spite Professor Sturley's acceptance of the Kirby Court's holding on ad-
miralty jurisdiction, he too questions the wisdom of a rule so poorly de-
fined: 
The breadth of this rule is reinforced by the narrow exception -
in essence a restatement from the opposite perspective - that the 
Court recognized: "If a bill's sea components are insubstantial, 
then the bill is not a maritime contract." But, did the Court 
really mean to be so broad? Other parts of the opinion suggest a 
more restrictive test. The opening paragraph of the discussion 
on this issue for example, argues that the bills of lading at issue 
in the case "are maritime contracts because their primary objec-
tive is to accomplish the transportation of goods by sea from 
Australia to the eastern coast of the United States." The next 
paragraph (echoing the rejected "incidental" exception mini-
30. [d. 
31. [d. at 394-95. 
32. With the adjective "soft," the author does not mean to suggest "soft-law" as in the sense of 
a soft rule on international human rights, promulgated by an NGO, but merely a rule without clear 
definition, that will inevitably lead to future confusion and absence of uniformity. 
33. Sturley, supra note 4, at 299. 
34. [d. 
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mizes the rail journey as "a 'fringe' portion of the intercontinen-
tal journey promised in the [bills of lading]." And the paragraph 
after that speaks of "focusing our inquiry on whether the princi-
pal objective of a contract is maritime commerce."35 
This author agrees with Professor Sturley's better solution to multi-
modal jurisdiction choice of law issue: the Supreme Court should have 
simply limited the mixed contract doctrine to non-multi-modal con-
tracts.36 This holding would have been an advancement for multi-modal 
law, as it would have brought all multi-modal, maritime contracts under 
the purview of federal admiralty law.37 However, in arriving at that hold-
ing, the Court would have eliminated all questions regarding application, 
instead of creating new ones.38 
Under the Supreme Court's Kirby holding on federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion, geographical or spatial analysis still exists, as does the potential for 
a "maritime" contract that sees the majority of the cargo transportation 
carried out on terra firma. Contrast this with the precedent set forth by 
the Supreme Being in Genesis, where the land and the water are two dis-
tinct realities, no: irs, and's, or substantial's, about it. 
II. THE AFfERMATH OF THE KIRBY UNIFORMITY 
TRAINWRECK IN THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS 
After reaching very questionable conclusions on both maritime jurisdic-
tion and agency, Kirby then cited a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case-
Kukje Hwajae Ins. CO. V. The MIV Hyundai Libertj9 - implying initially 
that the Kukje Court reached the wrong conclusion.40 It is important to 
note that the Ninth Circuit's agency holding was in harmony with the 
prevalent international view on the agency status of an intermediary or 
non-vessel operating common carrier.41 Ultimately, however, the Su-
preme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case 
back to the Circuit Court for a re-hearing in light of Kirby's holding on 
35. [d. 
36. See id. at 301. 
37. [d. 
38. See id. 
39. 294 F. 3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2002). 
40. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 398-99 (citing Kukje 294 F.3d 1171, 1175-77). 
41. See Andrew Brown, The Supremacy of United States (Maritime) Law, JOURNAL OF 
TRANSPORTATION, LoGISTICS AND POLICY, IQ 2006. 
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agency.42 The stage was set for the first real world application of Kirby's 
new agency decision.43 
The Kukje Court quickly dismissed the speculation about their applica-
tion of the Kirby precedent as they announced at the beginning of the 
opinion: 
In particular, the Supreme Court criticized our 'agency' analysis 
with respect to the forum selection clause. As subsequent brief-
ing has clarified, however, there is a completely separate, pre-
served and properly argued route by which we reach the same 
answer to the first question, that is, the binding effect of the fo-
rum-selection clause .... We again afflrm.44 
The Ninth Circuit executed a graceful spin-move, completely dodging 
the Kirby agency issue. Mter the Ninth Circuit's re-hearing of the Kukje 
case, two other lower federal courts, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and the Federal District Court of South Carolina, both "examined" 
the Kirby case in the course of their decisions.45 
In BDL International v. Sodetal USA, Inc.,46 a district court was pre-
sented the admiralty jurisdiction issue that the Supreme Court had re-
cently molested in Kirby.47 The BDL court held that a contract was mari-
time in nature where it included ocean shipment from France to Charles-
ton, South Carolina, and over-land shipment within South Carolina.48 
However, the District of South Carolina, much like the Ninth Circuit in 
Kukje, dodged the thorny issue by entirely avoiding the "substantial" 
question.49 
Similarly, in Folksamerica Reinsurance Co., v. Clean Water of N. Y., 
Inc., 50 the Second Circuit also was presented the issue of whether an in-
surance contract could be classified as "maritime," under the precedent 
set in Kirby.51 During its analysis, the appellate court commented that in 
42. See Kukje, 408 F.3d at 1252. 
43. See Kehagiaras, supra note 26, at 307. 
44. Kukje, 408 F.3d at 1252. 
45. According to the "Citing History" feature on Westlaw, the Kirby decision has been at least 
"cited" in more than twenty cases since its inception. The two cases discussed in this comment were 
the only two in which the Westlaw editors felt that the respective courts "examined" the Kirby 
precedent. 
46. 377 F. Supp. 2d 518 (D.S.C. 2005). 
47. See id. 
48. See id. at 520-24. 
49. See id. at 520-24. 
50. 413 F.3d 307 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
51. Seeid. at312. 
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Kirby "the Supreme Court exercised admiralty jurisdiction over a con-
tract with non-maritime components deemed to be more than 'inciden-
tal." '52 However, ultimately the Second Circuit determined that the ap-
plicable test, fashioned from the Kirby precedent, was "whether the prin-
cipal objective of a contract is maritime commerce."53 Based on the vari-
ous provisions in the insurance contract, the court ultimately held that the 
principal objective was maritime commerce, so the contract was subject 
to federal admiralty law.54 The Second Circuit did not have cause to con-
sider the "substantial" issue. 
Based on these three recent cases, it is apparent that the only uniformity 
that the Kirby case has spawned in the lower federal courts is a uniform 
reluctance to apply the new limited-agency rule or the new substantial-
spatial rules. For a "maritime case about a trainwreck," purported to be a 
catalyst for the standardization of federal admiralty law,55 the Kirby case 
itself can be characterized as a trainwreck maritime case about a train-
wreck. 
52. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original). 
53. Id. (quoting Kirby. 125 S. Ct. at 394). 
54. See id. at 323-24. 
55. See Kirby. 125 S. Ct. 385. 
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